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Abstract
International organizations play an important role in policy implementation. As member states do not necessarily resolve polit-
ical disagreements before delegating tasks, this article focuses on how individual member states seek to inﬂuence policy
implementation by international organizations. It argues that the institutional context in which delegation takes place affects
the opportunities for such unilateral inﬂuence. Particularly when the agent has considerable autonomy, implementation is
likely to be a contested process. The article presents evidence on the implementation of peacebuilding policy by three inter-
national organizations in Kosovo after independence in 2008. Despite the fact that the member states within the UN, OSCE
and EU fundamentally disagree on the legal status of Kosovo, the organizations have deployed substantial peacebuilding mis-
sions. The UN, OSCE and EU have, however, different institutional designs: implementing agents in the UN and OSCE have, by
default, more autonomy than those in the EU. We analogously observe variation in how and to what extent member states
exert unilateral inﬂuence during implementation of peacebuilding policy on the ground in Kosovo.
Policy Implications
• Policy implementation by international organizations can be as politically contested as the decision-making by member
states. Rather than avoiding the delegation of policy implementation, states should seek to balance between who gains
during decision-making and who gains during implementation.
• Strong states have a disproportionate amount of inﬂuence over policy implementation. Weaker states should focus on the
institutional constrains in which such unilateral inﬂuence plays out. This is an effective method of setting boundaries.
• The stricter collective control mechanisms in international organizations, the less likely individual member states exert
unwanted unilateral inﬂuence. States should, however, also recognize that strict collective control often comes at the
expense of the quality of policy implementation.
• The nitty-gritty institutional rules on stafﬁng and budget allocation signiﬁcantly affect how individual states can inﬂuence
policy implementation by international organizations. States should be aware that these politics of bureaucratic resourcing
can also undermine the quality of policy implementation.
Lobbying international organizations
International organizations play a key role in policy imple-
mentation. Member states often delegate resources – such
as staff or budget – for international organizations to
implement their agreements. By delegating implementa-
tion functions, member states run two risks. First, the
implementing agent may not implement the agreed policy
(Hawkins et al., 2006). Second, individual member states
may put unilateral pressure on the agent to inﬂuence
implementation at the expense of the other member
states (Sridhar and Woods, 2013; Stone, 2011; Urpelainen,
2012). Implementation by international organizations is
thus likely contested. We show in this article that the
autonomy agents have in the use of resources for imple-
mentation, affects how member states unilaterally inﬂu-
ence implementation.
We analyse peacebuilding by three international organiza-
tions in Kosovo, which presents a unique empirical case to
study contested implementation. The member states of the
United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe (OSCE) and European Union (EU) fundamen-
tally disagree on the status of Kosovo. As a result, they have
launched ﬁeld missions in Kosovo (UNMIK; OMIK; EULEX)
with a ‘status neutral’ mandate. This has moved the political
contestation on the status of Kosovo to the implementation
phase. Member states which recognize Kosovo – such as
France, UK and US – have tried to pressure these ﬁeld
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missions into progressive actions. Status quo-oriented mem-
ber states – such as Russia, Serbia and Spain – have tried to
ensure that these missions stick to their mandates.
Unilateral inﬂuence often takes place through like-minded
staff within the international bureaucracy who act on behalf
of the lobbying state. But we ﬁnd that the autonomy of the
ﬁeld missions is an important scope condition. Scholars
measure autonomy in international organizations by refer-
ring to discretion over the use of staff and budgetary
resources (Birchler and Michaelowa 2016, p. 2; Brown, 2010;
cf. Heldt and Schmidtke, 2017; Ege and Bauer, 2017). We
ﬁnd that because they have more autonomy during imple-
mentation, the UN and OSCE missions are more attractive
targets for unilateral inﬂuence by member states than the
EU missions.
This article is based on document analysis, leaked diplo-
matic cables and interviews conducted by both authors in
Kosovo and mission headquarters in New York, Brussels and
Vienna between 2008 and 2015 (Dijkstra, 2011, 2013; Eck-
hard, 2014, 2016a, 2016b). Given the informal nature of uni-
laterally lobbying, gathering data on concrete examples
presents a challenge. The case studies we present after our
theoretical discussion should be seen as illustrations of infor-
mal lobbying which inform rather than test the theory.
Theoretical perspectives on contested
implementation
The traditional concern with the delegation of implementa-
tion is whether the agent faithfully implements the agreed
policy. Because agents typically have specialized expertise,
they may follow their own interests. Scholars have therefore
studied how agents can be given proper ex ante incentives
at the moment of delegation and be ex post controlled after
the agent has implemented the policy (McCubbins and Sch-
warz, 1984).
International organizations, by deﬁnition, consist of three
or more member states (Hooghe and Marks, 2015; Peve-
house et al., 2004). International policy is thus the result of a
compromise. This complicates delegation. Scholars have dis-
cussed how divisions among the member states affect the
process of delegation (e.g., Hawkins et al., 2006; Hooghe
and Marks, 2015; Koremenos et al., 2001; Nielson and Tier-
ney, 2003). Member states, for instance, carefully select
agents and determine levels of discretion (e.g., Huber and
Shipan, 2002; Pollack, 2003; Tallberg, 2000); they ensure that
their nationals are well-represented (Kleine, 2013; Parizek,
2016); and they consider a range of control mechanisms (da
Conceic~ao-Heldt, 2013; Dijkstra, 2016; Lyne et al., 2006; Niel-
son and Tierney, 2003).
Scholars have paid less attention to the second problem:
shirking by an agent often beneﬁts some member states at
the expense of others. Individual member states therefore
may have an incentive to lobby the agent during policy
implementation. While the theoretical literature acknowl-
edges the distributional conﬂict over the design of policy, it
assumes that the member states are not present when the
agent implements policy (Bauer et al., 2017; Hawkins et al.,
2006; Martin, 2006; Nielson and Tierney, 2003; Pollack, 1997).
After all, why would member states delegate if they want to
be actively involved in implementation? Yet several scholars
have recently shown that member states do often control
agents on the spot (Delreux, 2008; Eckhard, 2016a; Kerre-
mans, 2006). Urpelainen (2012) has proposed an advanced
model of contested implementation, but has not provided
empirical evidence.
In this article, we consider (1) decision-making and (2)
policy implementation as two distinct arenas where conﬂict
between the member states plays out. This implies that
member states which ‘win’ in one arena can accept a ‘loss’
in the other arena (Manulak, 2016; Urpelainen, 2012). It also
gives member states a choice where they ﬁght their battles:
before or after delegation. Member states may accept an
agreement not fully in line with their preferences, if they
anticipate that they have inﬂuence over the implementing
agent. For example, progressive states may accept status
quo agreements, if this allows them to move forward
toward policy implementation.
Member states vary in their ability to exert inﬂuence.
While strong states are obviously in a position to substan-
tially affect decision-making and implementation (e.g. Dijk-
stra, 2015; Panke, 2012; Stone, 2011), they are likely to be
even more powerful during implementation (Manulak, 2016;
Urpelainen, 2012). During formal decision-making, member
states have to collectively agree and often require consen-
sus. This gives weaker states a say. On the contrary, the uni-
lateral lobbying of the implementing agent is an informal
(obscure) activity. And informality beneﬁts powerful states
with more resources (Dijkstra, 2017; Kleine, 2014; Stone,
2008, 2011; Urpelainen, 2012).
We add to this state of the art the ﬁnding that the institu-
tional context in which delegation takes place affects the
opportunities for unilateral inﬂuence. As Urpelainen (2012, p.
710) writes: ‘[i]f international bureaucrats are relatively
autonomous (. . .) states can expect great beneﬁts if they
successfully collude with them’. Autonomy varies along the
extent to which member states put in place monitoring
mechanisms and restrictions on the agent’s discretion in
using resources for implementation. Most previous scholar-
ship on autonomy points to the use of budgetary and staff
resources as two key dimensions that ‘characterize the lee-
way granted to some public sector organizations’ (Maggetti
and Verhoest 2014, p. 239; for a more extensive discussion
see Ege and Bauer, 2017; Heldt and Schmidtke, 2017). When
implementing agents have both the competences to act
and the resources to do so, we expect that the member
states will unilaterally try to inﬂuence how these agents
implement policy.
International organizations in Kosovo: variation in
autonomy
We analyse the implementation of peacebuilding policy by
three international organizations (UN, OSCE and EU) in
Kosovo. As such, we study a speciﬁc instance of policy
implementation: These are operational international
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organizations with a mandate to build capacity (Rittberger
et al., 2012). The three cases of policy implementation are
very similar. The three organizations act in the same envi-
ronment of post-war Kosovo, implement peacebuilding pol-
icy through ﬁeld missions, and in all three organizations the
member states are highly divided concerning the status of
Kosovo. Some member states have recognized Kosovar
independence; others have not. As such the members have
formally agreed that the peacebuilding policies should be
‘status neutral’. While the three organizations are similar in
most respect, they differ in the autonomy of ﬁeld missions
to use staff and budgetary resources. This variation in insti-
tutional design is exogenous to the case of Kosovo.1
First, autonomy of staff depends on the extent of ex ante
managerial discretion (captured by the command and con-
trol structure) and the ex post reporting requirements (see
Figure 1). There is considerable variation across the three
organizations in terms of the discretion of staff. In the UN,
command is delegated to the UN Secretary General’s Special
Representative, who heads the mission on the ground (Karl-
srud, 2013). While this civilian may be in regular contact
with the UN headquarters in New York, he or she is in
charge. UN missions also have limited formal reporting
requirements: in the case of Kosovo one quarterly report.
The OSCE is slightly less autonomous. Command also lies
with the head of mission and the support structure in
Vienna is very limited (Eckhard, 2016a). But standard report-
ing is more extensive, with weekly, monthly and six monthly
reports being issued by missions (Eckhard, 2016a). In the EU,
on the other hand, operational command is with the Civilian
Operations Commander in Brussels, who sits in the Euro-
pean External Action Service (EEAS). The member state
ambassadors provide ‘political control and strategic
direction’ on a daily basis (EU Council, 2007, Art. 8). Report-
ing requirements are as extensive as in the OSCE with addi-
tional strategic evaluations being executed every two years
(Dijkstra, 2013).
Second, the budget is another indicator of mission auton-
omy. In the EU, member states, the European Commission,
and European Parliament negotiate top-down the seven-
year multiannual ﬁnancial framework. It is a centralized pro-
cess, which gives the EEAS and in particular the missions
limited authority over budgetary resources (Dijkstra et al.,
2016). In the OSCE, budget ﬁgures are developed bottom-
up in a consultative process that begins at the mission level
and ends in the Permanent Council. But individual OSCE
member states have a veto and detailed insight into budget
positions (PC.DEC/486, 2002). Negotiations over the annual
Uniﬁed Budget prove a challenge every year. Single member
states in the UN have considerably less inﬂuence on budget
decisions. The UN Secretary-General’s drafts the budget pro-
posal which is then decided by the General Assembly by
majority voting (A/RES/55/235, 2001). Individual states can-
not veto the budget.
The three organizations thus vary in their autonomy. UN
member states have established an independent agent with
autonomy on staff discretion (high) and budget allocation
(high). In the OSCE, formal command also provides leeway
for mission management (medium), but budget decisions
can be vetoed by single states (low). The EU constitutes the
least autonomous case with Brussels-dominated command
(low) and budgeting (low). We therefore expect that UN
missions are the most attractive targets for unilateral inﬂu-
ence, followed by OSCE missions and ﬁnally EU missions.
To provide evidence for this claim we analyse the peace-
building missions of these three organizations in Kosovo.
Figure 1. Command and control in OSCE, UN, and EU peacebuilding missions
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The case of Kosovo provides us with unique empirical evi-
dence due to similar political disagreements in the member-
ship of the UN, OSCE and EU. Some member states have
recognized Kosovo as a state following the Kosovar unilat-
eral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008.
Other member states still see Kosovo as an autonomous
province of Serbia. In the UN Security Council, France, the
UK and the US recognize Kosovo, while China and particu-
larly Russia do not. In the OSCE, the US and Russia maintain
the same positions. The EU is split between the 23 member
states which recognize Kosovo and the ﬁve member states
that do not (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain).
Because the membership is split, all three organizations pur-
sue a so-called ‘status neutral’ mandate. This is close to a
status quo arrangement. These organizations formally can-
not take progressive actions to bring the recognition of
Kosovo closer.
Despite disagreement on status, the member states have
delegated to all three organizations the mandate to imple-
ment peacebuilding policy. This takes the form of the
UNMIK, OMIK and EULEX missions. While the scope of these
three missions differs and has evolved since they were ﬁrst
deployed (UNMIK/OMIK in 1999 and EULEX in 2008), they all
largely deal with assistance and local capacity building in
the area of security, rule of law and other key state func-
tions. The purpose of these missions therefore often logi-
cally conﬂicts with the ‘status neutral’ mandate: they have,
in their own ways, the objective of creating and strengthen-
ing the parallel Kosovar institutions rather than re-integrat-
ing them into the Serbian state. This puts the staff of these
missions in a tricky spot. As professionals, most of them
want to be successful in strengthening the Kosovar institu-
tions. They therefore hold progressive preferences. Yet this
clearly clashes with the interests of the status quo-oriented
member states. Because the Kosovo status was not settled
prior to delegation, we expect contested implementation:
the progressive member states will try to ensure that imple-
mentation indeed constitutes a further step towards Kosovar
statehood, while status quo member states will try to ensure
that the missions stick to their mandates.
The contest over UNMIK’s direction
Our empirical analysis starts with UNMIK, which was estab-
lished after the intervention of NATO in 1999, through the
UN Security Council’s Resolution 1244. It speciﬁed that
Kosovo should ‘enjoy substantial autonomy within the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia’ (S/RES/1244, 1999, p. 3, emphasis
added). This was a setback for US diplomacy. Throughout
the Balkan crisis, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had
believed that independence was the only solution to the
Kosovo conﬂict, even if this meant force (Daalder and O’Han-
lon, 2000). Yet following NATO’s intervention, which had not
been authorized by the Security Council, Washington sought
to ease tensions. In the interest of compromise with Russia,
the US accepted an international administration with a sta-
tus-neutral mandate in Kosovo, which remained part of Ser-
bia as long as there was no political solution. The US
therefore agreed to a temporary status quo agreement, with
the understanding that independence was ‘clearly on the
way’ (quoted in Ker-Lindsay, 2009, p. 16). As a consequence
the disagreement on status ‘was passed down to the opera-
tional level [in UNMIK] and left to the bodies responsible for
implementing the deliberately vague new settlement’ (King
and Mason, 2006, p. 73). UN missions are decentralized, by
default, and have signiﬁcant autonomy. UNMIK was no differ-
ent: little operational guidance was provided by the Security
Council. In early 2000, UNMIK’s mission head, Bernhard
Kouchner, travelled to New York to ask member states how
to interpret the term ‘substantial autonomy’ in Resolution
1244. When being left without a concrete answer, he report-
edly said that he was planning ‘to move ahead as he sees ﬁt,
and that he does not intend to wait for a council deﬁnition
of where he is headed’ (New York Times, 2000). Subsequent
heads of mission, nonetheless, anticipated a red line that
they avoided to cross. Michael Steiner, for instance, declared
a politically-charged border resolution by the Kosovo Assem-
bly invalid in 2002, even though he privately held – like
many UNMIK heads of mission – progressive preferences
(Ker-Lindsay, 2009; King and Mason, 2006).
On the ground in Pristina, the main battle was between
UNMIK and the Kosovar Albanian politicians. The provisional
president Ibrahim Rugova and the former political leader of
Kosovo’s liberation army Hashim Thaci used every opportu-
nity to stress that independence remained their ultimate
political goal. In light of its status neutral mandate, UNMIK
had to repeatedly put a break on these ambitions. It
responded with a piecemeal tactic that foresaw technical
state building before deciding on status (Caplan, 2005; King
and Mason, 2006). The Provisional Institutions for Self-Gov-
ernment were established in 2001, which the Kosovo Albani-
ans saw as a step towards independence. They were greatly
annoyed when UNMIK stated it was not (Ker-Lindsay, 2009).
Michael Steiner furthermore announced the ‘Standards
before Status’ policy in 2003: Kosovo’s status would not be
addressed until the provisional institutions had met several
good governance criteria (King and Mason, 2006).
UNMIK’s stalling tactic of incremental political concessions
ultimately failed. In March 2004, organized ethnic riots
swept through the country and left 19 civilians dead and
hundreds injured. Given the broken relationship between
UNMIK and the Kosovar Albanians, which now regarded
UNMIK as an obstacle towards independence, it was widely
understood that UNMIK ‘was no longer the appropriate
body to run Kosovo’s affairs’ (Ker-Lindsay, 2009, p. 22). It
became also clear that the negotiations on Kosovo’s ﬁnal
status had to start, something that the Norwegian ambas-
sador Kai Eide stressed to the Security Council following his
investigation into the March 2004 riots.
In the meantime, the US and EU allies started to unilater-
ally inﬂuence UNMIK on the ground. The key mechanism
was through the appointment of likeminded senior staff.
Following the riots, the head of UNMIK was replaced by the
progressive Søren Jessen-Petersen. Under Jessen-Petersen,
‘the whole mission was reorienting towards getting out’
(King and Mason, 2006, p. 211). While ‘New York had told
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Steiner to slow down on the transfer of powers’ (King and
Mason, 2006, p. 211), the US now brought in a new UNMIK
deputy, Larry Rossin, who ‘believed that powers should be
transferred to local institutions much faster’ (King and
Mason, 2006, p. 211). King and Mason (2006, p. 210) con-
clude: ‘Just as NATO has gone around the UN when it
undertook the war, now, albeit more subtly, the same great
powers were bypassing the UN again’.
Despite such massive lobbying, the UNMIK organization
itself posed a challenge. Peterson and his team asked all
units which tasks they could hand over to the local authori-
ties, but some ‘people were trying to hold on to their unit’
(UNMIK Interview 3). In particular UNMIK ofﬁcials with Rus-
sian nationality lobbied against transferring government
functions from the UN to Kosovar authority (UNMIK Inter-
views 1 and 2). The 2004 riots and domestic political pres-
sure had nevertheless unleashed irreversible political
dynamics. In October 2005, the Security Council launched
the ﬁnal negotiations on status under the leadership of for-
mer Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. This was a signiﬁcant
progressive move, opposed by Serbia, as it put status on
the agenda. But the diplomatic effort failed due to Russian
discontent (Ker-Lindsay, 2009; Perritt, 2010). Ahtisaari
nonetheless tabled his plans for ‘supervised independence’
which eventually led to Kosovo’s declaration of indepen-
dence in February 2008.
The implementation of UNMIK prior to independence thus
shows the relevance of unilateral inﬂuence. The Security
Council resolution which launched UNMIK was an uncom-
fortable status quo compromise. It brought international
politics to Pristina, where the different parties started to uni-
laterally lobby UNMIK from the moment it was established.
The strongest pressures came from the local Kosovar Albani-
ans (with the tacit support of the US). The international
community, on the whole, was long supportive of UNMIK
and its attempts to postpone the difﬁcult questions. Yet
after the March 2004 riots, the US and EU allies started to
push for status negotiations. At the same time they actively
worked on getting UNMIK out of Kosovo by increasing the
pace of the transfer of tasks to the local authorities. They
worked through UNMIK staff. But it is also clear that Russia
sought to counter such inﬂuences through its own nationals.
The UN’s decentralized command setup and the absence of
high frequency reporting provided autonomy for UNMIK
staff to interpret the mandate and therefore opened up con-
tests about the direction of policy implementation.
(Non-)withdrawal of UNMIK and OMIK after
independence
The unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo on 17
February 2008 increased the divisions within the interna-
tional community. While within days, France, Germany, Italy,
the UK and the US recognized Kosovar independence, Rus-
sia condemned the declaration as a ‘blatant breach of the
norms and principles of international law’ (S/PV.5839, 2008,
p. 6f.). These divisions had a signiﬁcant effect on UNMIK and
OMIK. While the recognizing countries wanted UNMIK and
OMIK replaced by EULEX, as proposed in the Ahtisaari plan,
for Russia and Serbia the two missions had to stay. Russia
and Serbia were in a strong position, as it would require a
new resolution by the Security Council. As the Russian rep-
resentative to the Security Council made clear, ‘UNMIK’s
reconﬁguration is inadmissible without the Security Council’s
authorization’ (S/PV.5944, 2008, p. 16). Reconﬁguration is
essentially a question about resource allocation. Budget
plans determine the number of staff deployed in ﬁeld mis-
sions and their ﬁnancial resources. The UN and OSCE differ
with respect to budget autonomy. In the UN, Secretary-Gen-
eral Ban Ki-moon proposed the budget which only needed
to be approved by the majority of member states in the
Assembly. In the OSCE, by contrast, single member states
have a veto on the budget. Our evidence shows that these
differences in institutional design explain why UNMIK was
signiﬁcantly downgraded after 2008 while Russian control
over the OMIK budget prevented staff reductions.
The original game plan for reconﬁguration had already
been drawn up by the EU and UN ofﬁcials prior to indepen-
dence. When it became clear that the Ahtisaari negotiations
had failed, the EU started contingency planning for its
EULEX mission during the summer of 2007 (Dijkstra, 2011, p.
201). US diplomatic telegrams, available via Wikileaks, fur-
thermore show extensive consultation between the UN and
the progressive member states. A picture emerges of pro-
gressive UN ofﬁcials, such as the head of UN peacekeeping
operations who stated that ‘the UN wants to leave Kosovo
as quickly and completely as possible’ (08USUNNE-
WYORK407_a, 2008). UN ofﬁcials expressed also the expecta-
tion that the plans for the UNMIK reconﬁguration are
workable unless Russia ‘wildly object[s]’ (08USUNNE-
WYORK385_a, 2008). The UN strategy was to informally con-
sult with all key players, but importantly not to seek formal
Security Council endorsement (08USUNNEWYORK407_a,
2008).
Despite the early progressive messages from the UN
ofﬁcials, the US and EU were particularly worried about Ban
Ki-moon and his wish to have the buy-in from Russia and
Serbia (08STATE52042_a, 2008). US ambassador Zalmay Kha-
lilzad said that the US need to ‘keep the UN’s feet to the ﬁre
in face of Russian resistance’ (08USUNNEWYORK407_a,
2008). Interestingly, even some UN peacekeeping ofﬁcials
themselves asked the US government to lobby Ban Ki-moon
for their own plan to ‘reconﬁgure UNMIK . . . even if this
must be done in the face of strong Russian and Serbian
opposition’ (08USUNNEWYORK465_a, 2008).
When it became clear that Russia would block the UN
Security Council from providing guidance, Ban Ki-moon had
to take measures himself in light of the changed situation
on the ground (08USUNNEWYORK706_a, 2008). The changed
situation could be summarized as: (1) the adoption of the
Kosovar constitution, which came into effect in June 2008
and rendered the civil administration part of UNMIK irrele-
vant; (2) the deployment of EULEX which rendered the
police and justice component of UNMIK irrelevant; and
ﬁnally (3) the general unwillingness of the Kosovar authori-
ties to cooperate with UNMIK. He therefore told the Security
© 2017 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2017) 8:Suppl.5
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Council that ‘the conditions on the ground require a practi-
cal adjustment to the structure and proﬁle of UNMIK’ (S/
2008/354, 2008, para 14, emphasis added).
In the light of his reconﬁguration decision, the UN, EU,
US, Serbia, and Russia eventually agreed on a so-called ‘six-
point-plan’ clarifying the transfer of competences from
UNMIK to EULEX. It was presented by the Secretary General
in November 2008 and meant that in practice UNMIK would
relinquished all operational activities (S/PV.6025, 2008).
EULEX would be ‘status neutral’ and report to the UN on its
activities. The Secretary General’s proposal for the 2009 bud-
get thus reﬂected a drawdown in budget from $210 Million
in 2008/09 to $47 million in 2009/10. Despite the six-point
plan compromise, Serbian and Russian representatives still
expressed ‘concerns’ in the light of these reductions (GA/
AB/3911, 2009). Outvoted by a majority of states in the bud-
get committee, however, they were unable to prevent the
reconﬁguration which led to a staff reduction by nearly 90
per cent (see Figure 2).
While UNMIK was thus drastically reduced, OMIK – for-
mally under the overall UNMIK umbrella – was not signiﬁ-
cantly affected by the reconﬁguration. Naturally, OMIK was
considerably smaller than UNMIK proper. And it was less
an obstacle to Kosovar independence, as it dealt with
democratization and institution-building rather than civil
administration or executive police and justice. But it was
still part of the ancien regime and would continue to give
Russia and Serbia leverage in Kosovo as OSCE members.
Before independence, Russia and Serbia had introduced a
motion to henceforth extend the OMIK mandate on a
monthly basis (SEC.GAL/27/16, 2016, p. 14). Initially, this
was meant to pressure the mission to remain ‘status neu-
tral’ (ICG, 2008, p. 17). After independence, it provided
Moscow and Belgrade with an effective lever to also pre-
vent downgrading.
Indeed, the reason for the OMIK’s unchanged ﬁeld pres-
ence was not the continued relevance of its services. The
mission was under great pressure to downgrade. Western
allies and ‘the US tried to shut down the mission which for
them presented an obstacle to Kosovo’s independence’
(OSCE Interview 1). Given Serbia and Russia’s control over
the mandate renewal, they attempted to instead downgrade
OMIK by manipulating the budget preparations. Other than
the UN, the OSCE drafts its budget bottom-up: staff in ﬁeld
missions determine their ﬁnancial requirements which are
put together by the secretariat headquarters in Vienna to be
decided on by the Permanent Council. In the process lead-
ing up to the 2009/10 budget, staff forwarded signiﬁcantly
smaller budget ﬁgures. A US code cable demonstrates that
this happened due to US unilateral pressure. The cable
refers to a situation in which an OSCE ofﬁcial spoke to a US
diplomat about the budget cut:
[I]f the Quintet and other like-minded states do not
now show coordinated and ﬁrm support for reduc-
tions during upcoming budget negotiations, Serbia
and Russia will dominate the discussion and walk
the reductions back (. . .). Without the proposed
Figure 2. Number of UNMIK, OSCE and EULEX staff (2003-2014)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
UNMIK 4585 4362 3386 2592 2513 2252 257 150 153 149 133 120
OMIK 276 226 197 221 226 172 163 167 158 148 140 133
EULEX 1651 1567 1650 1381 1142 1109 688
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Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from following sources: UNMIK: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations: http://www.un.org/
en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml; OMIK: OSCE Annual Reports; EULEX: Annual yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute
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cuts, [the ofﬁcial] said OMIK would be unlikely to
come forward with comparable reductions in com-
ing years, given the internal turmoil it generates
(09USOSCE234_a, 22 October 2009)
The episode again conﬁrms the relevance of both unilateral
inﬂuence and mission autonomy. Similar to the UN, propo-
nents and opponents of independence lobbied the OSCE
both in mission and at headquarters. Yet unlike the UN, the
OSCE was less autonomous in allocating staff and ﬁnancial
resources. Informal lobbying to downgrade the budget
failed due to Serbia and Russia’s veto in the Permanent
Council. As a result, OMIK staff levels remained almost
untouched. Although Russia and Serbia argued that there
was still a role for OMIK, the effect of their policy unmasks
this as hypocrisy. The renewable monthly mandate intro-
duced by the two states undermined OMIK’s performance
because long-term planning was made impossible and the
mission lost much experienced staff due to the insecure
contractual situation (Eckhard, 2016a).
Tight member state oversight and the absence of
contest on EULEX
The EU is also highly divided on the Kosovo dossier. This
political split in the EU has proved remarkably persistent.
Even the progressive ruling by the International Court of
Justice on 22 July 2010 (that ‘declaring’ independence is in
accordance with international law) has not helped to over-
come EU differences. Furthermore, while all member states
agree on the need to have stability and well-functioning
institutions in Kosovo, adopting the legal basis for EULEX
was a challenge. The member states were, in fact, forced
to adopt all the operational documents before the declara-
tion of independence (EU Interview 5, 6). This allowed the
EU to launch a mission without any reference to status, as
Kosovo was still under the legal framework of UNSC Reso-
lution 1244. It was an agreement clearly favouring the sta-
tus quo.
As could be expected given this background, implementa-
tion of the EULEX mandate was a delicate balancing act. In
much of the rhetoric surrounding the launch of EULEX, it
was made clear that EULEX would present a break from the
previous UNMIK mission. While UNMIK and OMIK were part
of the pre-independence political structure for Kosovo,
EULEX initially was perceived (by the Kosovars and the EU
elites alike) as the mission that would help Kosovo towards
statehood. It was made clear that EULEX would not be a
sort of ‘EUMIK’ (Solana and Rehn 2005, p. 2). Instead, it
would be much lighter in presence and would focus mostly
on supporting the Kosovar state. On the other hand, the
‘six-point plan’ of November 2008, which provided for a ‘sta-
tus-neutral’ role of EULEX, was not consulted with the
Kosovo government. ‘The change in their international sup-
porters’ stance’, as Dzihic and Kramer (2009, p. 16) report,
‘took them completely by surprise’. This resulted in a situa-
tion where Kosovar elites and the local population became
quite quickly disillusioned with EULEX.
As in the two other missions, contested implementation
was a possible scenario for EULEX. Immediately after the
declaration of independence, the Spanish Foreign Minister
Angel Moratinos said that the promised contingent of Span-
ish police ofﬁcers would not be deployed as a sign of
Spain’s opposition.2 But internal EULEX data reveals that
eventually all non-recognizers, with the exception of Cyprus,
deployed staff to EULEX. In 2011, a total of 260 out of 1,632
international staff came from the non-recognizing states
(EULEX, 2011). As such, even the non-recognizing states had
sufﬁcient opportunities for informal lobbying. Yet, at the
end of the day, the centralization of command and control
in the EU peacebuilding system effectively prevented unilat-
eral inﬂuence. Most importantly, a high frequency of routine
reports EULEX sent to Brussels informed member states at
all times of mission activities. Whenever status quo oriented
states felt that mission activities implied recognizing
Kosovo’s independence, they objected in the EU Council.
And this was frequently the case, as an internal code cable
speciﬁes:
Madrid and the other four non-recognizing capitals
complain to Brussels each time a routine report
even suggests that EULEX is venturing beyond the
bounds of status-neutrality and straying from its
mandate under UNSCR 1244, and Brussels, in turn,
notiﬁes EULEX headquarters of its offense (09PRIS-
TINA148, 2009)
Conﬁrming this quotation, several interviewees working in
EULEX and the Brussels’ support structures emphasized that
the EU Council committees ‘totally micromanage missions’
(EU interview 1, 2, 4). One interviewee said that ‘CIVCOM
formally can only intervene on matters of political and
strategic concern, but in Kosovo everything is political’ (EU
interview 3). Proponents of the status quo therefore used
the EU’s control capacities to ensure that EULEX would not
stray from its mandate. They even put EULEX in irons irre-
spective of the damage they caused.
Given this background it is hardly surprising that Koso-
vo’s rule of law institutions were rather unwilling to coop-
erate with a mission that did not recognize their
sovereign authority. Instead, they preferred working with
the more progressive (and also more autonomous) Euro-
pean Commission that has taken on the ‘approach of
diversity on recognition, but unity in engagement’ (Euro-
pean Commission, 2009, p. 4). Kosovar delegations several
times told the EU Council that they preferred to shift from
EULEX mentoring to Commission twinning projects
(Kosovo Interview 1). But Brussels’ oversight regime
revoked the head of mission any ﬂexibility in implement-
ing the mission’s ambivalent mandate in a way more
accommodating to the Kosovars. In 2009, the US embassy
warned that ‘[EULEX’s] cautiousness in hewing to status
neutrality and deﬁning its mission as purely technical (. . .)
is a serious limitation’ and that ‘it could quickly become
immobilized by its inherent political limitations’ (09PRIS-
TINA148, 2009). Several years later, a number of external
evaluations and studies indeed conﬁrm a mismatch
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between EULEX’s signiﬁcant resources and its disappoint-
ing performance (Capussela, 2015; Eckhard, 2016a; Euro-
pean Court of Auditors, 2012). And studies with a focus
beyond EULEX conﬁrm the pivotal role played by a
divided EU Council: ‘EU operations have been most effec-
tive when there has been a clear convergence of Member
State interests’ (Keohane, 2011, p. 202).
After the unilateral declaration of independence in 2008,
there was of course less need for the proponents of Kosovar
statehood to unilaterally pressure the mission towards
recognition. But the need to properly govern Kosovo
remained the same to avoid that the country turns into a
safe haven for smuggling and organized crime in the middle
of the Balkans. There is strong overall political interest in a
well-performing mission. This is why member states funded
the mission with a budget of over one billion Euro budget
since 2008. The ﬁnding that only ﬁve non-recognizers, of
limited power and size, signiﬁcantly obstructed the execu-
tion of the EU’s ﬂagship mission underscores the important
role formal institutional control mechanisms play in the con-
text of contested implementation.
Conclusion
Member states often delegate the implementation of their
agreements to international organizations. While academics
have previously focused on how member states attempt to
ensure that the agent faithfully implements the actual
agreement, we have proposed an alternative model. For us,
implementation remains a site of member states’ contesta-
tion. Member states may unilaterally lobby the agent during
implementation to ensure policy outcomes closer to their
preferences. We have argued that such unilateral inﬂuence
is likely to take place if the implementing agent has consid-
erable autonomy and decides on the use of resources for
implementation far away from the control of member states.
It is easier for individual states to lobby the agent in all
obscurity away from the oversight of the other member
states. It is therefore important to not only focus on the
power of the individual member states (Stone, 2011; Manu-
lak, 2016; Urpelainen, 2012), but also the institutional design
of the agent (Eckhard, 2016a). Equally, researchers who
study the policy-making inﬂuence of international public
administrations (Bauer et al., 2017; Eckhard and Ege, 2016;
Hawkins et al., 2006; Johnson, 2014; Johnson and Uper-
lainen, 2014) should consider the possibility of informal
lobbying.
Our ﬁndings on how the UN, OSCE and EU implemented
their peacebuilding mandates in Kosovo demonstrate that
single member states in a divided principal indeed make
use of unilateral inﬂuence. They act through key individuals
working within the implementing bureaucracy, with the
nationality serving as token of loyalty and common inter-
est. We observed such inﬂuence mainly for powerful states
with signiﬁcant resources, such as the US and Russia (but
did not systematically test for this). We found that missions
vary in terms of the extent of unilateral inﬂuence. On the
one hand, the autonomous UN mission was subject to
signiﬁcant inﬂuence. Both, status quo opponents and pro-
ponents lobbied UN staff to implement the mandate along
their respective political intentions. On the other hand, the
most similar system arrangement of our research design
demonstrates the limits of unilateral inﬂuence. Similar to
UNMIK, autonomy in formal command allowed OSCE mis-
sion managers to insert cuts in the budget plan. Control
over the budget decision, however, allowed Russia and Ser-
bia to walk back such reductions, other than in the UN.
More signiﬁcant even is the case of EULEX. The centralized
formal command structure of EU peace operations from
the outset prevented mission managers to deviate from
the letter of the mandate.
To be sure, our argument is not one about the conse-
quentiality of unilateral inﬂuence. The evidence does not
allow discriminating between autonomous bureaucrats’ pri-
vately held positions and member state inﬂuence. For exam-
ple, although the downgrading of UNMIK in the end
appears to be in line with the progressive US position, we
cannot unequivocally say that US pressure was the sole
cause. Diplomatic telegrams rather imply that Ban Ki-moon
acted along functional requirements. Instead, our argument
is about the consequentiality of institutional designs in the
way they permit or limit unilateral inﬂuence. Reductions in
the agent’s autonomy to use resources for implementation
(staff and budget) restrict opportunities for unilateral inﬂu-
ence. Future research on unilateral inﬂuence should thus
consider the institutional design of the agent to better
understand member states’ inﬂuence strategies. Further-
more, those interested in the consequences of bureaucratic
autonomy should be aware that there seems to be a dis-
crepancy between formal and informal autonomy when it
comes to policy implementation.
Notes
We thank the editors and two anonymous reviewers for
their helpful comments and suggestions which have
improved the article. We are also grateful to the partici-
pants of the 21st century global governance section at the
2016 ECPR conference in Prague for their comments on an
earlier version of this paper. This article is based on
research carried out in the project “International Public
Administration: The Emergence and Development of
Administrative Patterns and their Effects on International
Policy-Making (IPA)” (http://www.ipa-research.com) funded
by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under grant
number FOR # 1745 KN 891/6-1. It is also based on the
results from the EU-CIVCAP project (https://www.eu-civcap.-
net) which has received funding from the European
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
under grant agreement No 653227.
1. The cases are not entirely independent as the mandate of EULEX
was informed by previous UNMIK practices (Solana and Rehn 2005).
Yet in terms of institutional design, the three organizations are inde-
pendent cases.
2. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/spain-holds-staff-from-eu-
kosovo-mission (accessed 2 February 2017).
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